

23 Sept - 31 Oct '45 C12 A

23 Sept: 1945.

I proceeded to Sourabaya via Semarang. The same evening the Jap Vice-Admiral Sjibatu and about 12 members of his staff paid their respects at the Oranje Hotel.

I explained to the Admiral my orders from Admiral Patterson emphasising that I had not any authority to give him any orders, and that I could only make proposals to Admiral Patterson. In accordance with Admiral Patterson's statement I told Sjibatu that the Admiral's prime wish was: "Law and order", and that the Admiral understood as "law and order" that every citizen could go his own free way without being molested.

After this we arranged the programme of my inspections for Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday (24th., 25th., and 26th., September).

In the same way I met next day, 24th. September at 1200, the Jap Commanding General Iwabu to whom I also explained the above, and arranged some points of the inspection with him as the merchant naval harbour and dockyards were under his command.

24 Sept: 1945.25 Sept: 1945.26 Sept: 1945.

} Visited all Naval installations.

27 Sept: 1945.

Departed for Balik Papan by B.25.

28 Sept: 1945.

Arrived at Batavia by B.25 at 1500. At about 1830 I reported to Admiral Patterson on board H.M.S. CUMBERLAND. I reported verbally everything about Sourabaya and left several written statements about harbours, minesweeping, communications etc.

I also mentioned to the Admiral that Sourabaya water supply seemed much worse than formerly and that I had told the Japs that it would certainly be the Admiral's wish to get the water supply running again on normal conditions as the Occupation Army would need a large quantity of water. I specially told the Admiral about my explanation of law and order to the Jap Commanding Officers and he fully agreed with my statement. I asked the Admiral about the date of re-occupation. He thought probably 20th. Oct: but promised to warn me 4 days ahead. He agreed with me to order the Jap Commanding Officers to double their guards everywhere in town.

I presented to the Admiral a request from Vice-Admiral Sjibatu about his prisoners of war camps and he decided to leave this to my discretion as he did later by sending me the request with the following written on it in his own handwriting: "To Captain Huyer, R.N.N. I leave this to your personal discretion."

The Admiral specially emphasised his point of view about "law and order" which I could mention as his wish and order to the Jap authorities. His last words to me were: "Don't ask, do!"

29 Sept: 1945/

29 Sept: 1945.

Arrived at Sourabaya about 1700 by Special Plane on orders from Rear-Admiral Patterson. On my way to the Oranje Hotel I perceived that already the town was in a nervous and disquieting condition.

In the evening I had a meeting with the Jap Admiral and General. I showed them both my orders from Admiral Patterson and made them sign the original as acknowledgement. I told them emphatically that I was not able to give any orders without first referring to Admiral Patterson, who would issue all orders via Jap Army H.Q. Batavia. I gave them again the explanation of Admiral Patterson's view about law and order.

As I had found the town in a more nervous and disquietening state, I told them I would propose to Admiral Patterson stronger guards. Both the Admiral and General told me they would recall more troops from internment camps and the General decided to send 300 extra Kempeitai as guards to the women and children's quarter. I feared already that evening that things were not going too well but I had no proof!

30th. Sept: 1945.

The town was quiet again; there seemed to be many more guards, so that there was no need to send alarming signals to Admiral Patterson.

One of the most urgent things I had told the Jap authorities was that I was never given any command over them and could only refer my proposals to Admiral Patterson. The Admiral would issue his own orders.

There were already rumours of road blocks on the road to Malang and Modjokerto, but the General told me that the C.O. Kempeitai had made an inspection by armed car and had cleared away every obstacle. So it appeared that General Iwabu was going to abide by the official surrender terms. I cannot help thinking that Iwabu's attitude changed that Sunday night, 30th. September/1st. October, on secret orders he received from Jap High Command for later on every action on his part was absolutely contrary to his undertakings and promises.

During the afternoon I paid a visit with my Chief of Staff to former Dutch Royal Naval Yards.

1 Oct: 1945/

3 Oct: 1945.

In the morning it appeared that the Nat. Committee had managed to use the city police against the mob and conditions in the town were improving. At 1200 I drove out with a city-police escort (my Jap. guards having been replaced by city police guards) in order to prevent the hotel being attacked by the mob. The Nat. Committee acknowledged the Oranje Hotel as being the property of the Allied Command and ordered that care of the Allied Command, RANM and the Red Cross should not be molested. (The previous day almost 50 cars had been stolen from RANM). I managed to stop the transport of women from Semarang to Soerabaya on 2nd. October.

At Moroborangan I was unable to cross the airfields on account of the Indonesian crowds and snipers who were around and causing themselves. As I could not afford to lose control of the aerodrome (possibly my only means of communication) I resolved to proceed straightaway to the Nat. Committee and make the strongest protest against their handling of affairs. I was received by the full Committee at the entrance to the Governor's office and talked to them for about 1 1/2 hours. I told them that as they had disbanded the Jap Army and Navy, had stolen all Jap arms and "de facto" taken over all power in the city, that they were responsible with their lives for all slaughtering of Jap prisoners, Jap civilians and for all looting of Jap Army and Naval stores and possessions. They had to maintain law and order and by their own order we understood that every citizen could move about safely and as he wished. There were only three points in town not yet taken over by the mob - the Jap Admiral's staff, about 30 officers and a very small guard, the Jap General's staff, about 20 officers and a small guard and the Naval Aviation Yards. Soediman, the resident, told me they would be stormed that night. That meant that the whole structure of Jap command would be destroyed. I had to avoid this at any price as -

Jap Naval Aviation Yards. were in splendid condition with all stores sorted out and could be used straightaway for at least two Catalina Squadrons and about 2 or 3 Fighter squadrons. There were about 40 Jap. reconnaissance planes, a flying boat and three serviceable D.C.III's (pre-war American planes). By keeping the Naval Aviation Yards I had control over the aerodrome.

Jap Admiral's Staff. By this staff and their secret wireless station I was still controlling the time-sweepers in the Western Entrance which had to continue sweeping for magnetic mines as these had not yet all been swept from the Entrance. On no account could I afford the 20 time-sweepers falling into Indonesian hands, for that would mean no piloting for the approaches to Soerabaya.

Jap General's staff. By controlling the Jap General I could force him to order his troops outside Soerabaya to fight on and keep under their control as much as they not get lost or given up by them.

Soediman and his full Committee agreed to leave me the Japs as P.O.W. as they were in prison, and to leave me the Jap. Admiralty, Jap General Army H.Q. and the Naval Aviation Yards and aerodrome on the condition that the Jap General and Admiral would surrender to the Allies. He wanted proof of that and I, on my part, undertook to produce it.

They agreed/

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On arrival here I found Dr. Duldjosewje had arrived to ask my advice about handling his Jap. prisoners and about their pay and food. I wrote out a memo. for him, which was briefly as follows :-

1. All Jap. Naval and Army Airforce personnel to return to Naval Aviation Yards and Aerodromes.
2. All Jap. Naval Yard personnel and ships' crews to return to the Naval Yards.
3. All remaining Jap. Naval personnel to be assembled in the R.N. Barracks, Gorkang.
4. All Jap. Army personnel to be assembled at Army Headquarters compound and at Dumbo Barracks.

As regards Jap. pay and food I intended to give orders to the Jap. staffs. An hour later I got his reply that the Nat. Committee agreed fully, but did not dare to carry out this order as it was for fear of the mob, which would not understand this. They hoped labor would be able to put orders into effect and be hand over all the Japs to me.

5 Oct: 1945.

My officers on the night-club and Mr. Cdr. Brown, R.N.M.S., could not stay there any longer in account of the mob. R.N.M.S. planes were ordered and the Alaska L'penn late July, and the R.N.M.S. were working the mob look the Naval Aviation Yards and a number of the R.C. Jap. prisoners. (See further 05/1000/Oct: Div. S.O. R.N.M.S. to T.M.C.).

6 Oct: 1945.

Mr. Cdr. De Vack (R.N.M.S.) got a message from the Nat. Committee that no further co-operation could be given. De Vack and the Red Cross could not go on working in the Jap's quarters. All food to the Japs was stopped and the Nat. Committee forbade anyone to supply or sell anything to them. Nothing broke out afresh - this time the movement being directed against Japs, crews and Jap. staffs. The police made a search as they could not save. I made a formal protest to Seodinnan.

7 Oct: 1945.

Second protest to Seodinnan of last letter and sterling. I got the following reply :-

(Translation)

Sourabaya, 6th. Oct. 1945

To His Honour
Captain P.J.G. HUYET, R.N.M.
For Supreme Allied Command.

Your Honour,

As I will explain in extenso further on, I as the authority in the Sourabaya district consider it of the greatest importance to establish my attitude towards the Allied Command at Sourabaya represented by Your Honour.
As/

As Your Honour explained, the work of the Allies consists amongst other things of :

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1. Military matters.
2. the work of the R.I.I.

I recognise and understand that Your Honour, your staff and other officials desire to be considered as representatives of the Allies, apart from nationality and that you will not interfere with internal politics. In view of this I am ready to assist Your Honour as a representative of the Allies by guaranteeing peace and order of the community, a task which I also consider as my duty.

However, the People know, that attempts have already been made from the side of the Netherlands, which clearly aim at getting back this territory, by means of the N.I.C.A. and similar organisations. The people also know, that the officials of the Allied Mission under Your Honour's direction, consists nearly completely of Netherlands. In view of this fact the People consider these officials not as officials of the Allies, but wholly as functionaries of the N.I.C.A., who are evidently absent of the Authority of the Indonesian Republic, and for this reason dangerous to peace and order in this region.

In view of the above my help to you is considered by the People as assistance rendered to the N.I.C.A., which they do not like.

So, in order to prevent misconceptions from arising among the people and to prevent quarrels amongst the people, I, as the Authority in the Sourabaya district, have decided, to stop my assistance to the Allies for the time being, until I have received more detailed instructions concerning this question from our President.

The Chief of the Sourabaya District

Sgt. H. Soedjman.

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(presumably Dirdjosewojo).

In the evening the A.P.C. of the Jap, Admiral slunk in for orders for the minesweepers. The Admiral proposed to send them to a small port North East of Semarang. I order them all to Batavia, except for the small ones which are to anchor north of Djawong reef and disembark their crews.

7 Oct: 1945.

I ordered my Jap D.C.III plane in order to report to Admiral Patterson at Batavia. The plane is looted, empty and unserviceable for the next three days - if I can get my Jap pilots out of prison - so we decided to go by train with an Indonesian guard.

9 Oct: 1945.

1900. Received full escort to night train to Batavia. Indeed we reached the train and started. I had left my Chief of Staff to handle the Japs.

1930/

