

23 Sept - 31 Oct '45 C/2 A

23 Sept: 1945.

I proceeded to Sourabaya via Semarang. The same evening the Jap Vice-Admiral Sjibatu and about 12 members of his staff paid their respects at the Oranje Hotel.

I explained to the Admiral my orders from Admiral Patterson emphasising that I had not any authority to give him any orders, and that I could only make proposals to Admiral Patterson. In accordance with Admiral Patterson's statement I told Sjibatu that the Admiral's prime wish was : "Law and order", and that the Admiral understood as "law and order" that every citizen could go his own free way without being molested.

After this we arranged the programme of my inspections for Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday (24th., 25th., and 26th., September).

In the same way I met next day, 24th. September at 1200, the Jap Commanding General Iwabu to whom I also explained the above, and arranged some points of the inspection with him as the merchant naval harbour and dockyards were under his command.

<u>24 Sept: 1945.</u>	} Visited all Naval installations.
<u>25 Sept: 1945.</u>	
<u>26 Sept: 1945.</u>	

27 Sept: 1945.

Departed for Balik Papan by B.25.

28 Sept: 1945.

Arrived at Batavia by B.25 at 1500. At about 1830 I reported to Admiral Patterson on board H.M.S. CUMBERLAND. I reported verbally everything about Sourabaya and left several written statements about harbours, minesweeping, communications etc.

I also mentioned to the Admiral that Sourabaya water supply seemed much worse than formerly and that I had told the Japs that it would certainly be the Admiral's wish to get the water supply running again on normal conditions as the Occupation Army would need a large quantity of water. I specially told the Admiral about my explanation of law and order to the Jap Commanding Officers and he fully agreed with my statement. I asked the Admiral about the date of re-occupation. He thought probably 20th. Oct: but promised to warn me 4 days ahead. He agreed with me to order the Jap Commanding Officers to double their guards everywhere in town.

I presented to the Admiral a request from Vice-Admiral Sjibatu about his prisoners of war camps and he decided to leave this to my discretion as he did later by sending me the request with the following written on it in his own handwriting : "To Captain Huyer, R.N.R. I leave this to your personal discretion."

The Admiral specially emphasised his point of view about "law and order" which I could mention as his wish and order to the Jap authorities. His last words to me were : "Don't ask, do!"

29 Sept: 1945/ ....

29 Sept: 1945.

Arrived at Sourabaya about 1700 by Special Plane on orders from Rear-Admiral Patterson. On my way to the Oranje Hotel I perceived that already the town was in a nervous and disquieting condition.

In the evening I had a meeting with the Jap Admiral and General. I showed them both my orders from Admiral Patterson and made them sign the original as acknowledgement. I told them emphatically that I was not able to give any orders without first referring to Admiral Patterson, who would issue all orders via Jap Army H.Q. Batavia. I gave them again the explanation of Admiral Patterson's view about law and order.

As I had found the town in a more nervous and disquietening state, I told them I would propose to Admiral Patterson stronger guards. Both the Admiral and General told me they would recall more troops from internment camps and the General decided to send 300 extra Kompeitai as guards to the women and children's quarter. I feared already that evening that things were not going too well but I had no proof!

30th. Sept: 1945.

The town was quiet again; there seemed to be many more guards, so that there was no need to send alarming signals to Admiral Patterson.

One of the most urgent things I had told the Jap authorities was that I was never given any command over them and could only refer my proposals to Admiral Patterson. The Admiral would issue his own orders.

There were already rumours of road blocks on the road to Malang and Modjokerto, but the General told me that the C.O. Kempeitai had made an inspection by armed car and had cleared away every obstacle. So it appeared that General Iwabu was going to abide by the official surrender terms. I cannot help thinking that Iwabu's attitude changed that Sunday night, 30th. September/1st. October, on secret orders he received from Jap High Command for later on every action on his part was absolutely contrary to his undertakings and promises.

During the afternoon I paid a visit with my Chief of Staff to former Dutch Royal Naval Yards.

1 Oct: 1945/ .....

1. Oct.: 1245.

2 Oct. 1955.

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3 Oct: 1945.

In the morning it appeared that the Nat. Committee had managed to use the city police against the mob and conditions in the town were improving. At 1200 I drove out with a city-police escort (by Jap. guards having been replaced by city police guards) in order to prevent the hotel being attacked by the mob. The Nat. Committee acknowledged the Oranje Hotel as being the property of the Allied Command and ordered that cars of the Allied Command, R.A.F. and the Red Cross should not be molested. (The previous day almost 50 cars had been stolen from R.A.F.). I managed to stop the transport of women from Semarang to Soerabaya on 2nd. October.

At Yogyakarta I was unable to cross the airfields on account of the Indonesian crowds and snipers who were around and causing themselves. As I could not afford to lose control of the aerodrome (possibly my only means of communication) I resolved to proceed straightway to the Nat. Committee as I made the strongest protest against their handling of affairs. I was received by the full Committee at the entrance to the Governor's office and talked to them for about 1½ hours. I told them that as they had disarmed the Jap Army and Navy, had stolen all Jap arms and "de facto" taken over all power in the city, that they were responsible with their lives for all murdering of Jap prisoners, Jap civilians and for all looting of Jap Army and Naval stores and possessions. They had to maintain law and order and by law and order we understood that every citizen could move about safely and as he wished. There were only three points in town not yet taken over by the mob - the Jap. Admiral's staff, about 30 officers and a very small guard, the Jap. General's staff, about 30 officers and a small guard and the Naval Aviation Yards. Soedirman, the resident, told me they would be stormed that night. That meant that the whole structure of Jap command would be destroyed. I had to avoid this at any price as -

Jap Naval Aviation Yards, were in splendid condition with all stores sorted out and could be used straightforwardly for at least two Catalina Squadrons and about 2 or 3 fighter squadrons. There were about 40 Jap. reconnaissance planes, a flying boat and three serviceable D.C.III's (pre-war American planes). By keeping the Naval Aviation Yards I had control over the aerodrome.

Jap Admiral's Staff. By this staff and their secret wireless station I was still controlling the mine-sweepers in the Western Entrance which had to continue sweeping for magnetic mines as these had not yet all been swept from the entrances. On no account could I afford the 20 minesweepers falling into Indonesian hands, for that would mean no piloting for the approaches to Soerabaya.

Jap General's staff. By controlling the Jap General I could force him to order his troops outside Soerabaya to fight on and keep under their control as much as we not yet lost or given up by them.

Soedirman and his full Committee agreed to leave me the Japs as P.O.W. as they were in prison, and to leave me the Jap. Admiralty, Jap General Army H.Q. and the Naval Aviation Yards and aerodrome on the condition that the Jap General and Admiral would surrender to the Allies. He wanted proof of that and I, on my part, undertook to produce it.

They agreed/ .....

On arrived here I found Dr. Daidjosewjo had arrived to ask my advice about handling his Jap. prisoners and about their pay and food. I wrote out a memo. for him, which was briefly as follows :-

1. All Jap. Naval and Army Airforce personnel to return to Naval Aviation Yards and Aerodrome.
2. All Jap. Naval Yard personnel and ships' crews to return to the Naval Yards.
3. All remaining Jap. Naval personnel to be assembled in the R.U. Barracks, Gobang.
4. All Jap. Army personnel to be assembled at Army Headquarters compound and at Darro Barracks.

As regards Jap. pay and food I intended to give orders to the Jap. staffs. An hour later I got his reply that the Nat. Committee agreed fully, but did not dare to carry out this order except for fear of the Jap., which would not interfere against this. They had labor who were able to carry out into effect and to hand over all the Jap. to me.

5 Oct: 1945.

The officers on the staff of General M.L. Odr. Dr. S., P.M.P., would not allow themselves to be taken in accordance of the rule. C.R.E. Adams was present and said there was no record of the rule. He R.E. Adams was present and said there was no record of the rule. He R.E. Adams was present and said they would bring him into jail, so they had to let go. Next morning the Jap took the Naval Aviation Yards and returned to the 120 Jap. prisoners. (See further on 10 Oct: from S.A. R.T.C. to T.M.F.)

6 Oct: 1945.

Dr. Dr. Pech (M.M.I) got a message from the Nat. Nat. Committee that no further co-operation could be given. Naval and the Red Cross could not go on working in the prisoners quarters. All had to leave, was stopped until the Nat. Committee forbade anyone to supply or sell anything to them. Nothing but fresh - this they the government being threatened against Communists and Communists. The Police made a protest. I could not move. I made a formal protest to Soedirman.

7 Oct: 1945.

Second protest to Soedirman to just leave and stay home. I got the following reply :-

(Translation)

Soedirman, 6th Oct. 1945

To His Honour  
Captain P.J.S. Huyse, R.N.M.  
for Supreme Allied Command.

Your Honour,

As I will explain in addition further on, I as the authority in the Soemba district consider it of the greatest importance to establish my attitude towards the Allied Command in Soemba represented by Your Honour.  
As/ ....

As Your Honour explained, the work of the Allies consists amongst other things of :

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1. Military matters.
2. the work of the R.M.I.

I recognise and understand that Your Honour, your staff and other officials do not to be considered as representatives of the Allies, apart from nationality and that you will not interfere with internal politics. In view of this I am ready to assist Your Honour as a representative of the Allies by guaranteeing peace and order of the community, a task which I also consider as my duty.

However, the People know, that attempts have already been made from the side of the Netherlands, which clearly aim at getting back this territory, by means of the M.I.C.A. and similar organisations. The people also know, that the officials of the Allied Mission under Your Honour's direction, consists nearly completely of Netherlands. In view of this fact the People consider those officials not as officials of the Allies, but wholly as governors of the M.I.C.A., who are evidently subject to the Authority of the Indonesian Republic, and for that reason dangerous to peace and order in this region.

In view of the above my help to you is considered by the People as assistance rendered to the M.I.C.A., which they do not like.

So, in order to prevent misconceptions from arising among the people and to prevent quarrels among the people, I, as the authority in the Sourabaya district, have decided, to take my assistance to the Allies for the time being, until I have received more detailed instructions concerning this question from our President.

The Chief of the Sourabaya District  
Sgt. R. Soedibowo.  
Initialled D.  
(presumably Dwidjoesojo).

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In the evening the A.D.C. of the Jap, Admiral slunk in for orders for the minesweepers. The Admiral proposed to send them to a small port North East of Semarang. I order them all to Batavia, except for the small ones which are to anchor north of Djacoeung reef and disembark their crews.

2 Oct: 1245.

I ordered my Jap D.G.J.II plane in order to report to Admiral Patterson at Batavia. The plane is looted, empty and unserviceable for the next three days - if I can get my Jap pilots out of prison - so we decided to go by train with an Indonesian guard.

2 Oct: 1245.

1200. Received full escort to night train to Batavia. Indeed we reached the train and started. I had left my Chief of Staff to handle the Japs.

1939/ .....

1930. At Kertosono the train stopped and we were taken out by an armful of hooligans at the wish of the people of Kertosono. The attitude was at first aggressive, but after a couple of hours we got on quieter terms without the constant menace of arms. Finally we got beds in the village hospital.

10 Oct: 1945

On telephone instructions from Soedirman we had to go back to Sourabaya. We reached the train without trouble and got a special full compartment with a mob-safety-guard from the people of Kertosono. My own guard, one policeman and a railway official turned up again, having run away during the trouble. After passing Djorbanj the Belarive train guard stopped the train by the emergency brake and we went back to Djorbanj as the people there objected to our proceeding. At Djorbanj again it was rather rough. All kinds of arms were displayed with us in the centre. Many telephone calls to Sourabaya followed.

At 1300 hours we were unexpectedly marched out of the Station and put into a motorbus. We then started off to Sourabaya with a Parrot's guard.

This journey was a success; every one of the rail block guards knew of our passing and at 4 o'clock we reached Police H.Q. of Sourabaya.

Luggage inspection followed and the two Daniels were stolen. Three of my party were transported to jail and I myself was taken in my own car to the former residence of the British Council. They provided me with three servants from the Oranje Hotel and from there I got a meal.

At 2100 the Chief of Police came and explained that they had put me there for my own safety. I was not in custody, but they advised me not to go out for fear of attack by the mob. He promised to send me a day or A.D.C. (Jap interpreter) for communication with the J.A.C. Then Major Cdr. Greene and Major Finley (C.A.A.F.) arrived and I handed to Major Greene my reports and correspondence. The same night I destroyed every instruction order and British Port Party order I had, and only just in time. The house was guarded by a police force of about ten men.

11 Oct: 1945.

1500. All R.A.F. and allied staff personnel were brought in (60 in all). They had been rounded up early in the morning from the hotel and kept at the Seaport Club by Proceedats. (The Seaport Club was the HQ of the most left-minded section of the mob - completely communistic). The remainder of my cash (f.250,000) was stolen. (f.2,000,000 remained hidden in the safe of the manager. Under Brigadier Halliday on 27th October, with a guard of 50 Marbles we found it still in the safe and the full amount was taken over by British Army H.Q. and stored in their safe).

12, 13, 14, 15 Oct: 1945.

Interned at Kejoen with no communication with the outside world. Indonesians confiscated everything on behalf of the Republic. Looting and rape went on steadily.

16 Oct: 1945.

See 0430. Everyone was called up told to dress and pack his luggage.  
Note 0500/ ....  
1. \*\*

0500. We were taken in two truckloads to jail. Luggage should have come in a third but was completely stolen by the mob. We had rather an unsociable welcome - they called us their breakfast. The prison was in the hands of the mob and we were put into a large cell. Hundreds of Europeans and Eurasians were already in that jail. We remained there during 16 Oct; and

17 Oct: 1945, until the morning of

18 Oct: 1945, without anything and practically no food and guarded by the former jailbirds. On the morning of 18 Oct; a delegation of Jail personnel arrived and told us that it had been discovered that we were not prisoners like the rest but that we were in protective custody. So we got a bit to sleep on and better food - this time sufficient, but only consisting of rice and vegetables and one piece of fish or a small piece of meat.

A R.A.F. pilot and two R.M.L.I. Army girls were separated, the pilot being put in a dark cell, and the two girls in the women's section. They had been seriously beaten up. Our Indonesian medical officer of R.A.M.C., Dr. Kedien Subiono was never seen again, and it is pretty sure that he was murdered. From my cell I saw 3 Wards, and one was being taken out.

19 Oct: - 20 Oct: 1945. Nothing to report.

21 Oct: 1945.

Major de Thijssen (R.A.F. Air & Personnel Corps) and Lt. Capt. de Back were seriously beaten up in my cell.

22 Oct: 1945. Nothing to report.

23 Oct: 1945.

The whole party of 36 was marched off to another part of the prison, where we were able to walk freely in the daytime and were only locked in at night in cells for 5 men. Two medical officers of my staff were brought in, one first being seriously beaten up.

24 Oct: 1945. Nothing to report.

25 Oct: 1945.

1330. We were locked in. (We discovered later that the British had made a surprise landing.)

26 Oct: 1945.

The guard told us that the previous afternoon 300 Europeans were brought in.

2230. Captain Shaw, F.G.S. 611, 29th. Brigade woke me with a Maratta guard. We assembled all R.A.M.C. and Allied staff personnel. After an hour's search I managed to find the two Army girls and to collect the Naval Pilot from the dark cell, also about 25 European women.

We collected/ .....

We collected them all in my compound under a heavy Paratta guard. I left prison for Brigade Headquarters. F.S.C. 611 collected later that night from another camp, Mr. Harsen, my political adviser (designated Governor East Java).

27 Oct: 1945.

Long talks with Brigadier Vallaby followed. He showed me the disposition of his troops. I warned him most strongly against all the small posts of platoons and companies and told him point blank that the Indonesians would round them all up. In the afternoon I reported my warning and the Brigadier agreed with my point of view but did not recall the Brigade as he expected reinforcements at night so that he could establish sufficient strong points. The reinforcements arrived too late and the Brigadier paid with his life.

In the morning there was a long staff meeting. It was decided how to quarter the women, and the orders to be given to the Chief of Police.

1200. I got 50 Battalion and Captain class and rode with the whole batch of R.A.M.C. officers from prison and in accordance with U.N.I.C. shipped them immediately to Singapore. The Indonesians were sure they were M.I.C.A. personnel and were only too anxious to get at them again.

I stayed for further talk. Brigadier Vallaby took over my Chief of Staff, Lt. Col. Roelofs, Lt. Col. Wito van Gils, R.I.M.T. Army, as they were fully conversant with the defences of Surabaya, and Paymaster Cdr. Sievers for contracting with the Chinese for Army stores etc. My interpreter Hulserre, R.U.N.R., was taken on his staff also, and I was to proceed next day by plane to Batavia.

Then came the signal for the Indonesian attack on the British forces. Leaflets were dropped out of a plane commanding the death penalty to persons unlawfully armed.

The Brigadier called all the Indonesian leaders together for a conference and made them accept the terms of the proclamation. (Brigadier Vallaby got the proclamation himself from a dropped pamphlet.) He made a strong proclamation himself and after three hours talk the leaders accepted his orders. I warned him that they would recall their promise as they promptly did. It was a certainty that fighting would break out.

28 Oct: 1945.

My plane did not arrive. At 1500 a Chinese arrived in residence with F.S.C. 611 closed his house - a sure sign of a coming fight. It started all over Surabaya at about 1700-1730. At 1900 we managed to come through to the Battalion at the School.

29 Oct: / 30 Oct: / 31 Oct: 1945.

Fighting was in full swing. Fortunately I procured a rifle from one of the first wounded and was able to join the Paratta's, - splendid boys.

31 Oct: 1945.

I was evacuated as a wounded Paratta with our battalion.

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NOTE 1. \*

16 OCT: 1945

Bloody Monday. All Europeans and Eurasians were rounded up by the gangsters. Mr. Medical Officer van der Goot was included. He was present at Permoeda Headquarters (Singing Club) that evening and saw scores of Europeans and Eurasians tortured and killed by the mob at the Club. He was already undressed for his turn when they found him British R.W. Pass and took him out.

Van der Goot was kept until Tuesday, 24th. Oct; and saw practically all the murdering. Also a girl called Hoving (aged 15) had that evening to watch from 2000 till 0100 the slaughtering of Europeans. Resident Meessen has their reports for the N.I.L. Government. Both van der Goot and Miss Hoving are in Wilhelmina Camp, Singapore.

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NOTE 2.

On 2nd. Oct: early in the morning I sent my Jap Interpreter Officer, Lt. Cdr. BOB, R.N.M. to Bali with Wing Cdr. Parvis (R.A.A.F.).

Bob reports : On Oct: 1900 the Jap. Naval Captain in charge of Bali reported to Wing Cdr. Parvis that the situation in Sourabaya was very bad. The Indonesians had taken over the wireless station so that no communication was possible. At 2100 the situation was becoming worse too on account of the arrival of 2 Nationalist envoys from Sourabaya. Cdr. Parvis asked the Jap if he would make a stand if the Hotel was attacked. The Jap Captain answered that shortly before it was decided in Sourabaya by the Jap General not to fight or to use firearms and that he had received the same orders.

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At this time I was still in Oranje Hotel without being able to get into contact with the Jap. General. I only sent him order after order to fight. Only the next day, 3rd. Oct: at about 1700 I contacted the General who appeared already the previous day to have ordered his out-of-town garrisons not to use firearms. I ordered him to issue special orders by his wireless to all his garrisons to make the heaviest resistance with the use of all arms against the uprising Indonesians.

P.J.G. HUMER,  
CAPTAIN, R.N.M.

BATAVIA.  
2th. November, 1945